Stable government structures needed in Somalia

Interview with Rear Admiral Rainer Brinkmann, Director of the German Marine Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW), which cooperates closely with NATO.

What are the key messages of your presentation at MS&D?
Future operational scenarios will be different from conventional scenarios. They will involve operations in remote regions, under very different conditions. To illustrate the complexity of activities, let me just mention the difficult geographical, hydrographic and climatic conditions, the density and dynamism of marine traffic in coastal waters, parallel conduct of military operations and everyday maritime routine, and the need for coordination and cooperation with other players. That gives rise to a wide range of requirements for design and specification of future platforms, sensors and effectors. The presentation is designed to reflect on the operational conditions in mine warfare and to derive from that requirements for new technologies.

What are your current activities with the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150)?
The CTF-150 operates in a maritime area stretching from the Suez Canal around the Arabian Peninsula to the Strait of Hormuz. CTF-150 has a threefold mission ‑ in general terms, it is to prevent the use of the sea by terrorists, to intensify cooperation with the coastal states and relevant organisations, and to provide support in the event of emergencies. It is important to note in this context that the mission is a part of combating international terrorism.
The operational focus during the latest German command was in the North Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and the sea area off the Pakistani-Iranian coast. This geographical focus was possible because there are many other maritime forces operating in the Gulf of Aden for protection of shipping, and contributed directly to fulfilment of the CTF-150 mission.

To what extent is the CTF-150 engaged in combating pirates?
Just as the naval vessels and naval air arm, stationed mainly in the Gulf of Aden to protect shipping from piracy, indirectly helped to fulfil the mission of CTF-150 in combating international terrorism, the units of CTF-150 went to the aid of ships attacked by pirates, to help them in emergency situations. But combating piracy is not the main mission of CTF-150. Offensive action and active participation in combating piracy do not fit in with the German national mandate to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom.

How many naval vessels are currently operating off the coast of Somalia?
The figure varies from one day to another. It is not possible to give an exact figure. Alongside the well-known Task Forces 150, 151 and EUNAVFOR, each of which regularly comprises about 2 to 6 units, there are also various forces of NATO and other navies under national command deployed in the maritime area, and it is hard to say how much time they spend there on what purposes. Not all of these units are at sea all the time ‑ they spend some of the time in port for logistic and other reasons. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are also the link between the European and the African and Asian regions. Many naval forces pass this area simply on the way to other destinations. But all in all, it may be assumed that on average there is a double-digit number of units present there at any given time.

In January this year, the US Naval Forces Central Command set up the Combined Task Force 151, to be used specifically against pirates. How will the operations of the various naval groups be coordinated?
Their headquarters are located in Manama/Bahrain and in Northwood/UK respectively. The task forces CTF-150 and 151 are under command from Manama, whereas EUNAVFOR is under command from Northwood. These headquarters coordinate their activities closely with one another. They hold regular Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meetings, where representatives of the other nations affected also participate, and exchange information on intentions, operational planning and possibilities of cooperation.
At sea, the Task Forces provide each other daily with mutual information on the intentions, procedures and movements of their forces. The naval commanders also meet regularly for exchange of opinion and consultation.

Pirate attacks have increased despite the increased deployment of naval ships. What measures do you propose to combat piracy more effectively?
My personal view is that the only way to effectively repress piracy is ultimately to implement stable government structures in Somalia, and for the appropriate authorities to have the resources to take systematic action against piracy. That will not be possible from one day to the next. Until that can be achieved, numerous naval units and naval air arm forces will be needed to protect shipping. And it is also up to merchant shipping operators to take appropriate measures for their own self-defence, so as not to be wholly dependent on the presence of naval forces. It seems to me that there are many improvements possible in this area.

The attack on the cruise ship MS Melody was successfully repulsed by armed security forces on board. What arguments are there against arming merchant ships that have to pass through the Gulf of Aden?
Merchant shipping operators are concerned that arming their ships would bring with it a risk of escalation, and thus greater danger for crew members. This viewpoint is certainly understandable, and not entirely without justification. But merchant shipping operators should not underestimate their capabilities of taking pro-active steps for defence against attacks by pirates. Examples of successful measures used in the past by merchant ships to ward off attacks include the use of high-pressure hoses and sonic cannon, blocking access and routes by barbed wire, and barricading of bulkheads and onboard access. Pirates certainly weigh up effort and benefit, and act accordingly.

How high do you assess the risk that terrorists could launch joint attacks together with Somalian pirates, or take over their methods?
At present there is no indication of links between piracy and terrorism. To put it very simply, pirates want money, and terrorists want bloodshed. Terrorists certainly also need money for their projects, so theoretically it would be quite possible that they might use piracy as a way of getting it. But that means terrorists would run the risk of losing their cover ‑ of leaving traces, and of losing the advantage of surprise. That makes it very improbable that a connection of this kind would ever occur.
At any rate, the motivation of the currently active pirates is to procure money to improve their conditions of life, whereby it may be assumed that they are not acting on their own account, but on behalf of Mafia-like networks.